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 Another important soft fact has to 
do with continuity and governance, 
especially important in privately owned 
family businesses, which SMEs tend 
to be. What happens, for example, if 
the current manager or owner dies? Is 
there an established line of succession 
in place to ensure business continuity 
and good governance? 
 While hard and soft information 
is important in assessing the 
creditworthiness of all firms, soft 
information is particularly important 
for SMEs, due to the absence or 
unreliability of hard facts, and the 
reason why banks place significantly 
more weight on it. Crucially, a good 
assessment based on soft information 
means that borrowers could get a better 
deal on their loan. 
 As part of our study we analysed 
SMEs in the United States and 
Germany with the same credit rating 
to see whether some of them had 
better bargaining power. Bargaining 
power is determined by examining loan 
contracts in a particular credit-rating 
category for the interest rate charged 
and the collateral pledged, and then 
comparing them against the average 
interest rate and average collateral 
requirement respectively within that 
category. Firms that managed to 
negotiate a below-average interest 
rate and a below-average collateral 
requirement have bargaining power 
was based on a representative sample 
of SME loan data from both the USA 
and Germany.
Credit information
Let us first define what we mean by 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information or facts 
in the context of bank relationships. 
Hard information refers to the usual 
quantitative details found in financial 
statements, such as sales, profit, cash 
flows and leverage. Soft information, as 
the term suggests, is more qualitative 
and refers to such intangibles as 
management skills, company strategy 
and market share. It also includes the 
credibility and reliability of the company 
director or owner. It has been known 
in banking circles for a very long time 
that the character of a borrower plays 
an important role in deciding on a loan. 
 It is not only a question of whether 
borrowers are able of repay a loan; 
it is whether they feel duty-bound to 
do so. In fact, the American banker’s 
handbook goes as far as to say that 
“there is no substitute for character - it 
is a vital factor’’.
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in the United States of America 
and many European countries are 
limited in the ways they can finance their 
operations. While larger enterprises 
have access to capital markets for 
their funding, SMEs have to rely heavily 
on banks for their borrowing needs. 
This is because SMEs, unlike their 
larger counterparts, are not covered 
by the large credit rating agencies 
and do not have to publish quarterly 
or annual financial statements. And 
with few or no ‘hard’ facts available, 
SMEs are viewed by banks as being 
informationally opaque and difficult 
to evaluate financially. Consequently, 
these financial institutions have to 
resort to qualitative information (‘soft’ 
facts) about an SME and its manager 
or owner to assess creditworthiness.
 Through our recent research, we 
have sought to determine if there is 
a relationship between the quality 
of the available information (mainly 
‘soft’ facts) banks have on their SME 
borrowers and the resulting bargaining 
power of these borrowers. Our research 
Loan data from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has 
shown that such positive attributes as good management skills 
and character – so-called ‘soft’ facts – can improve a borrower’s 
bargaining power with their bank and thus loan terms.
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 A related implication is that loan 
officers might have to personally bear 
the negative consequences arising 
from high borrower bargaining power. 
If they were paid according to the 
contracted loan rate margins, however, 
lower spreads would reduce their 
variable compensation. Finally, there 
is the question of bank competition. For 
example, the number and structure of 
bank relationships as well as switching 
costs of borrowers might relate to the 
interaction between bargaining power 
and soft information in banking.
 To summarise the key findings, our 
study suggests that soft information 
represents an important and direct 
determinant of borrower bargaining 
power, with strong implications for banks 
and SMEs in the way they operate in 
the loan contracting process. 
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in our investigation. We then look to 
see if these two measures of bargaining 
power are related to a good hard- and 
soft-facts assessment. We are able to 
extract this information from the banks’ 
credit-rating assessment details.
Bargaining power
Our results are quite revealing and 
have consequences for entrepreneurs, 
SMEs and banks. We find evidence to 
support the hypothesis that bargaining 
power is directly related to good soft 
facts. What is more, we can show 
that soft information has not only first-
order effects on the credit rating of the 
borrowing firms, but also second-order 
effects on borrower bargaining power. 
This of course is excellent news for 
entrepreneurs and SMEs. After all, with 
the exception of the credit offered by 
their suppliers, SMEs rely mainly on 
banks for external funding and this can 
reduce their loan costs significantly.
 However, SMEs have to ensure 
that banks are fully aware of this 
soft information; something savvy 
managers with good communicating 
and negotiating skills are capable of 
doing. This may require SMEs to invest 
in this capability. We also find that 
entrepreneurs with a good educational 
background tend to have more 
sophisticated communication skills, 
and are consequently more proficient 
at negotiating with their banks and in 
using their soft facts to their advantage. 
 Our study also has implications 
for banks. Considering bargaining 
power and soft information relate to 
the strength of the bank–borrower 
relationship, loan officer turnover is 
recommended as an effective device 
to maintain incentives inside the bank 
and to avoid collusion between loan 
officers and borrowers. Furthermore, 
since the evaluation of soft information 
depends, among other factors, on 
the loan officer’s experience with the 
borrower, it could be reasonable to 
assume that new loan officers tend 
to make an ‘average assessment’ in 
order to trade-off the risk assessment 
and lending volume. Consequently, 
loan officer rotation helps to avoid a 
systematic drift towards increasing 
borrower bargaining power over 
time, arising either from gradually 
increasing accuracy of the loan officer’s 
assessment, or from collusion. 
“The character of a borrower plays an important 
 role in deciding on a loan.”
